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Demographers’ interest in fertility trends and determinants in 




Studies of fertility trends and determinants in developed countries are high on 
demographers’ research agenda. The interest in this subject is probably, to a large 
extent, motivated by a notion about low fertility being problematic, but demographers 
have not been much engaged in efforts to find out whether that is actually the case, at 
least as judged from the contents of the major demography journals. In this paper, the 
possibility of various individual- and societal-level effects of low fertility is briefly 
reviewed. Some of the harmful effects may be foreseen and considered an acceptable 
disadvantage by couples making fertility decisions, while others more rightly can be 
considered social problems. It is argued that knowledge about fertility trends and 
determinants may help us learn more about the consequences of low fertility and see 
clearer whether interventions may be justified and what specific steps one might take. 
Further efforts to expand this knowledge should therefore be welcome, and it is possible 
that demographers can make an important contribution by applying this knowledge in 
studies of consequences of fertility. A higher priority to forecasting might also be 
worthwhile. 
 
1 Department of Economics, University of Oslo and Statistics Norway. E-mail: oystein.kravdal@econ.uio.no. Kravdal: Demographers’ interest in fertility trends and determinants in developed countries  
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1. Introduction  
Several studies of fertility in developed countries are published every year, in journals, 
books, and various types of reports. However, as judged from the contents of the major 
demography journals over the last couple of decades, researchers who reckon 
themselves as demographers are primarily interested in describing fertility patterns or 
assessing how various individual or societal factors affect fertility. The possible 
consequences of low fertility have attracted much less attention in these outlets (see 
Appendix Table A1 for some statistics).
2 This may be considered as reflecting a general 
research tradition in demography. For many years, demographers seem to have been 
more interested in the determinants of demographic behaviour than in the 
consequences, unless the consequences are also “demographic” of course. Particularly, 
little attention has been paid to the welfare consequences at the micro level (Hobcraft 
2006).  
It is not obvious what the motivation for the quite massive efforts to analyse 
fertility trends and determinants in low-fertility settings actually is. While the authors of 
such papers of course explain the importance of the specific questions they address, the 
more fundamental motivation is usually not spelled out. Presumably, many researchers 
are driven by a somewhat diffuse idea that low fertility is potentially problematic for 
society or individual families and that it therefore may somehow be useful to know 
much about the trends and patterns in fertility and its determinants.
3 At least, some 
papers hint at such a rationale.   
In this paper, I discuss the potential value of research on trends and determinants 
of fertility in low-fertility settings. When doing this, I take for granted that the main 
goal of social science research in general is to establish knowledge that somehow 
(directly or by facilitating other research efforts) can improve the quality of life by 
helping individuals, politicians and planners in making wise decisions.  In other words, 
the key question is whether and how knowledge about fertility trends and determinants 
 
2 It should be noted, though, that it is often difficult to draw a sharp dividing line between analysis of 
consequences and analysis of determinants. One important reason is that a factor may affect fertility because 
it influences the implications of childbearing. For example, the fertility-depressing effect of education is 
probably partly the result of educational differences in the opportunity costs of childbearing. Thus, a few lines 
about consequences of fertility may be necessary to include in an analysis otherwise primarily dealing with 
determinants.  
3 Another and probably much less widespread justification for such research may be that it provides us with 
information about the characteristics of the parents of the next generation (Musick and Mare 2004). For 
example, if better-educated women and men have fewer children than the less educated (Kravdal and 
Rindfuss 2008), there will be a relatively small proportion in the next generation having better-educated 
parents. That is not necessarily something to be worried about, and that could warrant attempts to stimulate 
fertility in this group in particular (such as authorities in Singapore have tried; Palen 1986), but one might 
think that it could somehow be helpful to at least know the situation.  Demographic Research: Volume 22, Article 22 
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may contribute positively in this way. It is of course not sufficient that knowledge is 
established by researchers. To be influential it must also be disseminated to potential 
users. However, while it may well be worth discussing how this dissemination should 
be done and who should be involved, such issues are not dealt with in this paper.  
More specifically, this paper has two main parts, one about individual-level 
consequences and one about societal-level consequences. Each part starts with a brief 
review of the type of effects that low fertility may have, and I make the point that 
knowledge about trends and determinants may help us learn more about these effects. 
Next, I discuss whether the various consequences of low fertility may justify some sort 
of action, by politicians or others, what kind of steps one in principle might take, 
whether knowledge about fertility trends and determinants may help us answer such 
questions, and whether such knowledge also may be valuable after it has been decided 
how to respond to the potential problems associated with low-fertility. Such an attempt 
to clarify the research motivation may be important to investigators who need to see a 
deeper value of their efforts in order to keep up the work spirit, and it is certainly 
important to the agencies that fund this type of research, and that typically have an eye 
to the “usefulness” of the scholarly activities. 
My focus is on completed fertility. The age at first birth influences the number of 
children people eventually have, and it may have individual- and societal-level effects 
beyond that (Mirowski 2005, Lutz and Skirbekk 2005), but such issues are ignored.  
Further, the attention is largely devoted to intended fertility. Issues related to 
physiological constraints on fertility and unwanted births are not addressed specifically. 
The discussion is primarily meant to be relevant for wealthy countries, but most of it is 
relevant also for poor countries that experience low birth rates, such as China (Zhang 
and Zhao 2006).  
 
 
2. Individual-level consequences of low fertility  
2.1 Possible effects of childbearing on parents’ lives  
Childbearing affects people’s welfare and lifestyle in a number of ways. Some of these 
effects may be foreseen by the parents themselves and perhaps be desired. For example, 
children provide the parents with certain emotional pleasures, which of course is one 
reason why they want to have children. More specifically, children may show affection, 
they may help their parents feel that life has a purpose, they may be seen as giving the 
parents adult status (relevant only for the youngest parents), it may be fun for the 
parents to engage in various activities with the children, and it may be exciting to see 
them develop (Hoffman and Manis 1979; Nauck and Klaus 2007).  Kravdal: Demographers’ interest in fertility trends and determinants in developed countries  
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Childbearing also has economic implications, and the potential economic rewards 
have traditionally been - and still are in poor countries - a central motive for having 
children (Caldwell 1976). More importantly from the perspective of this paper, there are 
many children also in contemporary developed countries that contribute to the family 
income through agricultural or other types of work (Council of Europe 1996). Further, 
financial support from adult children may be important to the poorest segments of the 
elderly population in these countries, especially where public support systems are not 
well developed (Rendall and Bahchieva 1998). Children may of course also provide 
practical assistance when the parents are old or sick or are under special pressure for 
other reasons (Antonucchi et al. 2003; Barefoot et al. 2005; Lusyne and Page 2008). 
One may speculate whether such financial or practical help from children may become 
more important in the future because of an ageing-induced (see discussion below) strain 
on the public support arrangements  
However, there is also a negative side, in the sense that there are large expenses 
involved. A child needs, for example, food, clothes and equipment for leisure activities, 
and the parents will either have to forego some income because one of them (typically 
the mother) must withdraw from the labour force to care for the child the first years 
(Joshi 2002, OECD 2002), or they must pay others to do the child care. One or both 
parents may be able to put in extra hours of gainful work to ease the situation, but the 
family may still end up with a relatively weak economy (Aassve et al. 2006). It should 
also be noted that withdrawal from the labour market may be a loss not only 
economically, but also because of the social and other pleasures one may enjoy at the 
work place (perhaps not fully matched by the pleasures of spending more time with the 
child), and because a smaller economic contribution may weaken the woman’s 
influence vis-à-vis her partner more generally (England and Folbre 2005).  
Childrearing probably also has other types of effects - expected or unexpected by 
the parents. For example, parents may be less inclined to take risks than the childless 
(Wang et al. 2009) , they may be subject to stronger social control at home (Kendig et 
al. 2007), and they may be better socially integrated into the community (Knoster and 
Eggebeen 2006; Bühler 2008). Less favourably, they may also be more inclined to 
suffer from stress because of worries (beyond the economic ones alluded to above) and 
too many obligations (Evenson and Simon 2005; Mastekaasa 2000). Besides, the 
quality of the relationship may be influenced by whether the couple have children, how 
many they have, and the children’s age. On the one hand, it is a common notion that 
being able to share the pleasures of child rearing and seeing the child develop in a 
positive way may strengthen a relationship (Hoffman and Manis 1982). On the other 
hand, less time for work, (joint) leisure activities and intimacy with each other, more 
routine household tasks, and worries about the children may have the opposite effect, 
perhaps especially if the burdens are not equally shared. A number of studies have Demographic Research: Volume 22, Article 22 
http://www.demographic-research.org 667 
shown that the latter effects dominate so that marital satisfaction declines after a child is 
born or even with each additional child (Twenge et al. 2003). However, many couples 
with a quite poor relationship may decide to stay together because they think (rightly or 
not) that this is best for the child, so the association between fertility and the disruption 
rate (also reflecting selection of course) is generally negative: women and men with 
many (young) children are less likely to divorce than those with fewer children 
(Andersson 1997). 
Many of these consequences of childbearing may in turn influence the parents’ 
health and mortality (Grundy and Kravdal 2008).  In addition, there may be 
physiological effects. Most importantly in developed countries, pregnancies may affect 
the mother’s chance of developing cancer (in either direction, but most commonly in a 
favourable one) through hormonal changes or other physiological mechanisms (Salehi 
et al, 2008; Russo and Russo 2007). There may also be biological effects on the chance 
of getting other diseases (Fletcher et al. 2002; Skilton et al. 2009).  Obviously, such 
effects of parenthood are not relevant for men. 
 
 
2.2 Possible effects of siblings on children’s lives  
It is widely believed that children may benefit from having siblings, and this notion 
may be a factor behind the two-child norm that probably has affected fertility in 
wealthy countries for a long time (Blake 1968). However, there are likely to be both 
disadvantages and advantages, and there is little knowledge about the total impact. To 
start with the latter, several (but not all) studies have shown that children with siblings 
have particularly well developed social skills (e.g. Downey and Condron 2004). They 
may also tend to be less involved in activities that one can do alone and that may have 
some negative implications, such as watching TV (e.g. Bagley et al. 2006). On the other 
hand, there may be less economic resources available to those who have (several) 
siblings, both in childhood and later (Keister 2003), and they may get less attention 
from the parents. Because of such or other mechanisms, one might expect them to end 
up with less education, which has indeed also been shown in some studies (Polit and 
Falbo 1988; Downey 1995). By and large, however, there is no consistent empirical 
support for such an effect on educational achievements. For example, in a recent 
Norwegian investigation based on a large register-based data material, it was shown 
that the educational level attained by a first child does not depend on whether he or she 
has younger siblings (but that the younger siblings end up with less education than the 
first-born) (Black et al. 2005). Presumably, the effects of having siblings depend on the Kravdal: Demographers’ interest in fertility trends and determinants in developed countries  
668   http://www.demographic-research.org 
                                                          
economic resources of the parents and in society, and whether the parents have wanted 
as many children as they have. Such interactions have not attracted much attention.
4  
Some studies have also documented an intergenerational transmission of low 
fertility (Murphy and Knudsen 2002): those who have few siblings also tend to have 
few children themselves. Thus, if it is a disadvantage to have few children, there is an 
additional burden for those with few siblings.  
 
 
2.3 Identification problems  
Unfortunately, it is difficult to statistically identify such individual-level effects of 
childbearing on parents’ and children’s well-being, since there are many potential 
confounders. The desire to have a child depends, for example, on the partners’ earning 
potentials (Becker 1991), the quality of their relationship (Rijken and Liefbroer 2009), 
their access to child care (Rindfuss et al. 2007), their health (Testa 2007), and their 
preferences (i.e. whether, given incomes and childbearing costs, they want to spend 
time and money on children rather than other sources of satisfaction), which in turn 
depend on such factors as for example how urban their place of residence is (Kulu et al. 
2007) and their broader set of values (Lesthaeghe and Surkyn 1988). In addition, 
fertility is not only determined by the desire for another child, but also by whether it is 
physiologically possible to bear a child and the availability of contraceptives, which in 
turn are influenced by a number of factors (Easterlin and Crimmins 1985). Many of 
these fertility determinants may also affect, for example, the parents’ later health or the 
children’s development, but it is in practice difficult to fully control for them in a 
statistical analysis.  
It is hard to believe that one can ever make experiments in order to learn more 
about the individual-level causal effects of low fertility, but it may be possible to 
squeeze some information out of the differentials between those with single births and 
those with a twin birth, which may be considered a natural experiment (Li et al. 2008). 
The sex composition of the children is also an exogenous factor that may used for 
identification (Angrist and Evans 1998), because it affects the chance of having 
additional children but perhaps not the outcome under study more directly. The use of 
more advanced simultaneous-equation modelling (one set of equations for births and 
another for child outcomes) that allows control for joint unobserved confounders may 
 
4 In developing countries, it is often found that children with many siblings have a disadvantage both with 
respect to education and many other outcomes (e.g. Li et al. 2008). This disadvantage is now one of the most 
widely accepted motives for the efforts to reduce fertility, preferably through initiatives to avoid unwanted 
births, while the societal problems related to high population growth have been downplayed. See e.g. 
McIntosh and Finkle (1995) or Cleland et al. (2006). Demographic Research: Volume 22, Article 22 
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also be helpful (Steele et al. 2009). However, the most promising avenue is perhaps to 
collect panel data that include very rich information about various relevant welfare 
indicators of interest as well as what the individuals think about having (more) children. 
Because of their knowledge about determinants of fertility, demographers may have an 
important role to play in the construction and analysis of such data – regardless of 
whether the outcome under study is another “demographic event”, such as divorce or 
death, or something else.  
 
 
2.4 Society’s response to individual-level effects  
To the extent that low fertility really has effects at the individual level, is there any 
reason for concern? What kind of interventions might be appropriate, and how can 
demographers help? To facilitate the discussion of this, let us consider only one specific 
example: the consequences of wanting and having a second child versus remaining one-
child parents.  
It seems reasonable to assume that parents take both their own well-being and that 
of their children into account when making decisions. The situation is particularly 
simple if it is expected that both parties will benefit from, say, a decision to remain one-
child parents. Surely, the parents may see disadvantages of not having another child, 
such as the possibility of getting relatively little support when they are older, but they 
may think that this is more than outweighed by the advantage of having few children to 
care for while they are young adults. They may also be aware of the possible problems 
related to the socialization of an only child, but they may think that there are also 
advantages in terms of, say, more economic resources per child, so that the total effect 
on the child is likely to be non-negative. With this win-win situation the decision to 
have no more children is obviously sound. Stated differently, there are certain negative 
consequences both for the parents and the child, but they are outweighed by advantages 
for both parties, so a wise decision has been made. There is no “problem”, in the sense 
that others perhaps should have intervened to help the parents make another decision.  
Alternatively, the parents may realize that being an only child, by and large, is a 
disadvantage, but that it is small compared to what they gain themselves from having 
only one child. In principle, the opposite could also be possible. In either case, there is a 
conflict of interest and some bad outcomes that it might be helpful for politicians and 
planners to be aware of, but it is not obvious that the parents make a wrong decision by 
having no more children. If, on the other hand, the expected disadvantage for one of the 
parties is larger than the expected advantage for the other, it would be unreasonable to 
have only one child. Presumably, the parents do not make such a decision.  Kravdal: Demographers’ interest in fertility trends and determinants in developed countries  
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A quite different issue is that parents may be unaware of the consequences of their 
decision. This point was addressed also by Kohler et al. (2005), who argued that the 
relatively low level of happiness in the short term among two-child mothers could be 
partly due to underestimation of the additional work implied by a second child. 
Alternatively, it may turn out when the parents are older and need assistance from 
others that it is much more problematic than they thought to have only one child, or that 
it is more problematic than foreseen to be an only child. This situation must, of course, 
be general to deserve attention. There will always be some people who experience more 
negative outcomes than expected, while it may be opposite for others. The key issue 
from the perspective of this paper is whether childbearing tends to have more negative 
socio-economic, emotional or physiological consequences than the parents have 
foreseen and taken into account.    
If future research reveals that that there are such negative consequences of low 
fertility that parents tend not to take into account, knowledge about these consequences 
must be disseminated so that people can act in their own interest. This includes any new 
findings about individual-level consequences of childbearing, as well as knowledge that 
is already well established but unknown to many parents. However, to avoid spending 
any resources on finding out what parents know and don’t know, the conclusion must 
be that one should communicate widely everything that is known about the 
consequences. Redundant information can hardly be a problem.  
This argumentation hinges on the assumption that dissemination of knowledge is 
inexpensive compared to the welfare losses resulting from the “wrong” decisions that 
would otherwise be made, which seems reasonable in a developed-country setting.  It 
should also be noted that knowledge not necessarily leads to the change in reasonable 
behaviour. Many people may know what is best for them in the long run (after taking 
into account the value of current compared to later pleasure, as they see it) without  
really taking it to heart and act accordingly. This issue is addressed, for example, in the 
literature on smoking and drug abuse (Elster and Skog 1999), but not further dealt with 
here.  
To summarize, there is reason for concern, particularly if low fertility has 
consequences for adults or children that parents are not aware of. A sound response 
would be to disseminate existing knowledge about all individual-level consequences of 
low fertility and make efforts to learn more. Knowledge about fertility trends and 
determinants, whether produced by demographers or others, can facilitate such further 
identification of fertility effects. In principle, one might try to find out what is already 
known to the parents and only spread information about the remaining consequences 
(and if parents so far are well informed, there would not even be a “problem”, unless 
there are additional harmful consequences not yet known to anyone), but that would 
probably not be worthwhile.  Demographic Research: Volume 22, Article 22 
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2.5 Unsatisfied desires – reason for concern?  
There is also another type of individual-level “problem” that occasionally has been 
discussed, perhaps more in the grey literature and in policy reports (Commission of the 
European Communities 2006; European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and 
Working Conditions 2004) than in scholarly journals. The idea is that many people 
have fewer children than they consider “ideal” or would have liked to have if they were 
richer or healthier or had better access to child care, and that this is sad for them.  (In 
principle, low fertility may have adverse societal-level effects, so that it would also be 
better for others if they had more children – for example all the children that they 
ideally would have liked to have - but that is another issue, which is dealt with below.) 
However, it is not really obvious that such an individual feeling of discomfort resulting 
from unsatisfied fertility desires should be considered a “problem” in the sense that 
other people need to bother. As also pointed out by Lutz (2007), we all have unsatisfied 
desires. Some people would have taken great pleasure in driving a Rolls Royce, but do 
not have the money to buy it, while others dream about an annual 8-week vacation. The 
key issue must be whether the obstacles to further childbearing are “avoidable” or 
“unreasonable”, in the sense that they could be removed without taking too much from 
others. For example, if there are laws that make it extremely difficult to have a second 
child, but that have no favourable impact on anything else, they may be abolished. This 
is far-fetched, however. More realistically, there are economic or practical obstacles 
that can only be removed at the expense of others’ well-being.  
To elaborate on this issue, let us assume that a couple’s reason for not having 
another child is that it would cost, say, €150,000 to raise this child, while the emotional 
gains they would receive from that would only correspond to various other pleasures 
they could buy in the market for €100,000. If the costs were subsidized by €60,000, the 
couples might have had a child and been better off, but would that be a reasonable 
policy (assuming again that there are no externalities of childbearing)? Others would 
lose a total of €60,000 that they could have used to increase their wellbeing. In fact, 
their income loss is even larger than the benefit for the childbearing couple. 
Alternatively, assume that the price of a second child is €90,000, so that the couple 
might have one if they had the money, but that the amount is out of reach. Should we 
increase the couple’s income by taking from others, who might have bought something 
else for that amount that is just as valuable to them?   
In contrast, it might be acceptable to provide outside assistance if the child is 
worth much more than the price, for example if it is worth €1 million while the price is 
€150,000. Others would suffer a corresponding loss of income, but they may not be Kravdal: Demographers’ interest in fertility trends and determinants in developed countries  
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able to get as much for their money. However, this may not be a very realistic scenario.
5 
Anyway, it would of course be very difficult in practice to document that an increase in 
total utility may be achieved, and especially when one must compare different types of 
utility (the value of having another child versus the value of what others might have 
bought for the amount of support).  
 
 
3. Societal-level consequences of low fertility  
3.1 Possible macro-level effects of low fertility  
Most developed countries
6 will experience considerable ageing over the next decades 
regardless of the level of fertility in the years to come, but low fertility exacerbates the 
ageing, and it will also reduce the growth of the population size and perhaps even lead 
to a decline.
7  
There is a large literature on the consequences of ageing, not least within economic 
research. One strand of this literature essentially deals with the economic consequences 
of increasing old-age dependency ratios. For example, it has been argued that it may be 
difficult to sustain the commonly used pay-as-you-go pension system in a population 
with a larger proportion of elderly (Blake and Mayhew 2006). One may have to reduce 
the pensions, tax the workers heavier, or take up loans abroad, with possibly increased 
dependence on other countries. In addition, a higher proportion of elderly, who are the 
largest consumers of health services, will contribute to higher health expenditures 
(Dormont et al. 2006). Again, the result may be lower quality of the medical care 
(which is not to the same extent as the pensions regulated by law), or higher taxes or 
fiscal deficits (Gerdtham et al. 2005). However, this is not only of financial problems.. 
With a relatively small size of the population in the working ages, finding the workers 
to provide health care for the elderly may be difficult as well.  
 
5 The idea would make more sense from a health care perspective: several people  may each contribute an 
amount to finance extremely expensive life-saving treatment for one person, and the value of staying alive for 
that person may far exceed the sum of the others’ utility reductions. 
6 There are large differences between countries. For example, while the old-age dependency ratio is currently 
relatively low in Eastern Europe, it will be higher than elsewhere in Europe in 2060, according to a projection 
recently carried out by Eurostat (2008). This reflects a combination of low fertility and little immigration. 
Germany and the countries in Southern Europe, currently having the highest old-age dependency ratio in 
Europe after a long period with low fertility, are projected to follow a step behind. Eastern Europe is also 
more likely than other parts of Europe to experience a decline in the total population size over the next half 
century, while substantial growth is projected for the north and west.  
7 If fertility in a country is constant and below the reproduction level, and if we assume that there is constant 
mortality and no international migration, the age structure of the population will eventually stabilize, but the 
population will continue to shrink  Demographic Research: Volume 22, Article 22 
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Another argument is that ageing may have consequences for the welfare system. 
On the one hand, the young segments of the population may want to downsize the 
welfare state, given the increasing challenges involved in supporting the old population. 
On the other hand, there will be a larger proportion of old voters, who may want to 
maintain the current system or at least the parts of it that they benefit from. Thus, it is 
not obvious how ageing will affect the total size of the government spending (Galasso 
and Profeta 2007; Sanz and Velázquez 2007).     
Yet another issue is that the productivity of the work force may be affected by 
ageing. One possible negative effect is that a higher average age of the workers itself 
may reduce productivity, though there is much uncertainty about this effect since there 
will likely be self-regulating mechanisms involving for example the use of adult 
educational programs (Tang and MacLeod 2006; Skirbekk 2008; Disney 1996). 
Second, a larger proportion of elderly may reduce the productivity of the work force 
through a lower savings rate, possibly compensated to some extent by more import of 
capital (Demery and Duck 2006). However, there may also be counteracting positive 
effects of the low fertility that goes hand in hand with ageing: if the total allocations to 
education are fixed, fewer children means larger educational investments per child, 
which will increase labour force productivity later. Under certain conditions, this effect 
may more than outweigh the costs of supporting more elderly, leaving an economic 
impact of low fertility and ageing that on the whole is positive (Lee and Mason 2010).  
Finally, ageing may have environmental effects. Most importantly perhaps, it has 
been argued that old people’s consumption may be less damaging to the environment 
than that of the younger (McDonald et al. 2006).  
The importance of a possibly smaller total population size following in the wake of 
low fertility has been much less analysed, perhaps partly because there are still few 
countries that have actually experienced a population reduction. One possible issue is 
that a country may have smaller military power and less international political influence 
if the population, and therefore the absolute size of the economy, is smaller. This 
“nationalistic” argument is an old one, and motivated for example the early French pro-
natalist policies, but it may still have some relevance (Demeny 2003; Grebenik 1989, 
Jackson and Howe 2008). Another possibly harmful effect, relevant for some countries, 
is that further reduction in the population size may make it difficult for some sparsely 
populated regions to survive because there are fewer people to share the expenses for 
infrastructure (Felmingham et al. 2002). (An argument about populous countries having 
an advantage more generally through efficiencies of scale may be of less relevance in a 
globalized economy.) Further, it is possible that a reduced size of the domestic market 
undermines some of the optimism and willingness to take risks that one otherwise 
would have seen (Jackson and Howe 2008). On the positive side, a lower savings rate is 
needed to maintain the capital-labour ratio when the absolute size of the work force Kravdal: Demographers’ interest in fertility trends and determinants in developed countries  
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shrinks. In addition, a smaller population may cause less environmental damage. A 
trivial version of this argument is that, if all types of environmental imprints from each 
individual are fixed, fewer people means, for example, less emission of climate gases, 
less air pollution in general, less waste production, less deforestation, and less soil 
degradation due to food production (McNeill 2006). Reality is of course more complex 
because changes in population size may lead to changes in income-generating and 
leisure activities, in technology, and in policy, with implications for how each 
individual influences the environment. For example, should population decline lead to a 
higher average income, one may possibly - under certain conditions - experience an 
increased pressure on the environment. Currently, environmental concerns are reckoned 
among the strongest arguments against high population growth in poor countries 
(Cleland et al. 2006), so it may be somewhat hypocritical not to welcome a population 
decline in the rich part of the world (assuming that this is environmentally beneficial), 
and especially since the population-environment link is conditional on a number of 
economic and political factors (e.g. Panayoutou 1994) and may well be particularly 
strong overall (with some variation depending on what kind of degradation we have in 
mind) in affluent settings.  
Another type of externality also deserves to be mentioned: A couple’s fertility has 
effects on their own lives, and although many of the effects that are known to the 
couple may also be considered by themselves as positive (otherwise they might have 
chosen differently), they probably do not take into account in their decision-making that 
these effects on their own lives may have negative implications for others. In addition, 
there may be unforeseen effects that affect other people in a harmful way. For example, 
those with few children may be less integrated in the community, which may be 
acceptable to them (to the extent that it is foreseen), but there may be less positive 
implications of this for other people, one reason being the possible health effect of 
social cohesion (Islam et al. 2006). Another individual-level effect of low fertility is 
that the mothers will be more likely to have paid work. This will probably have 
important, and perhaps largely positive, societal implications. A related type of spill-
over effect would be, for example, that the entire society may be influenced if it is the 
case that only children tend to be less sociable than other children.     
Finally, it should be noted that there is a link between the micro and the macro 
perspective. According to the former, women or men who have few children may suffer 
from that themselves. However, their own low fertility may contribute to or be partly a 
result of others’ low fertility through learning and imitation effects (Goldstein et al. 
2003; Montgomery and Casterline 1996), and they may suffer from others’ low fertility 
as well. In other words, the parents’ own well-being may be influenced by other 
people’s fertility and their own fertility, the latter operating in part through the former 
or vice versa.     Demographic Research: Volume 22, Article 22 
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As with the individual-level effect, better data and methods can help us identify 
such macro-level consequences of low fertility and of the resulting ageing and low 
population growth or even decline. It is obviously necessary to take into account when 
doing such work that some of the factors behind the population structure may also 
affect the economic and social development through other channels. In other words, one 
motive for continued efforts to gain further insight into the fertility determinants is that 
this may help us learn more about the macro-level effects.  
 
 
3.2 Should anything be done to increase fertility?  
Even if negative externalities of low fertility are identified, political interventions are 
not necessarily justified. Below, I discuss reasons why politicians might want to make 
attempts to increase fertility, and whether knowledge about fertility trends and 
differentials may help them make a decision on this issue. Other possible responses to 
the societal-level consequences of low fertility are addressed in the subsequent section.   
Let us start with a simple example related to subsidies of childbearing costs. 
Assume that there are a number of couples who have only one child each because they 
think this is to their advantage (and it is not important now whether they are right about 
that or not). They may think that a child is only worth €100,000, while the cost of 
raising the child would be €150,000 Let us also assume that, for the others in society, 
there is a total advantage of €70,000 per additional child born. In that case, these other 
people would be able to offer the potential child-bearers, say, €60,000 if they have a 
second child. Many would accept that, since they would get a child of value €100,000 
for the price of €90,000. For each couple accepting the offer, the others would earn a 
total of €10,000, as they pay €60,000 and the benefit is €70,000. Thus, both parties 
would be better off (i.e. the situation was not Pareto optimal at the outset).
8   
The situation would be entirely different if the advantage for the other people than 
the childbearing couples had been only €40,000 for each additional child born. In that 
case, they would not be able to “bribe” the couples to have a second child. They would 
need €50,000 or more each, and the others would not be willing to pay that, because it 
would not be in their own interest. In fact, they would lose €10,000 on such a 
 
8 This argumentation is greatly simplified. For example, the consequences of low fertility may not be felt 
within the life-time of the older people, who might therefore be unwilling to contribute to their solution, while 
others who might be interested in compensating for a different behaviour are not born yet. Further, one may 
criticize the very idea of maximizing average utility (indicated here, for simplicity, by money amounts) for 
those alive. Also other ethical principles might have been applied. For example, one might have focused on 
total utility, to which a new life would add regardless of how miserable it were (Blackerby et al. 2005). 
Another and less challenging issue is that an amount of €10,000 would mean much more for a poor than a 
rich person. Taking that into account would require only a fairly trivial modification of the arguments.  Kravdal: Demographers’ interest in fertility trends and determinants in developed countries  
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transaction. Therefore, and in contrast to the first-mentioned case, a subsidy is not 
justified.  
Let us now turn to the possibility of increasing the incomes of the potential 
parents, rather than reducing the costs of childbearing. Assume for example that a child 
is worth €110,000 to a couple and costs €100,000, but that they can only afford to pay 
€50,000. If their incomes are increased by €50,000, there is a chance that they may have 
a child (unless higher incomes also increase the price of the child or the parents decide 
to spend on something else). Anyway, they may be considered to enjoy a welfare gain 
of at least €50,000. If half of them have a child and half do not, and if the advantage for 
those who are not potential child-bearers is, say, €20,000 for each child born, one may 
consider taxing the latter an amount of €50,000 per potentially childbearing couple to 
increase the total level of well-being in society. Such a step would increase the welfare 
of the potential child-bearers by €50,000, but only reduce the others’ welfare by 
€50,000 minus half of €20,000 (i.e. satisfying the Kaldor-Hicks criterion for efficient 
allocation; e.g. Feldman and Serrano 2006).  
Rather than thinking about this in terms of taxation, we might consider the 
authorities as having two options if there suddenly is some money to be paid out (for 
example as  a result of smart investments the government has made abroad): pay 
€50,000 to a couple at a childbearing age or €50,000 to another couple. Both parties 
will want the money, but the total welfare may be higher if it is given to the former.  
On the other hand, if the externality effect is more than €100,000, it would be an 
advantage for everyone if the money is given to the potential child-bearers. The 
remaining population would actually be better off that way than if they got or kept the 
money themselves.   
More generally, relevant pro-natalist policies may involve a number of benefits for 
the potential child-bearers (McDonald 2006). Consider, for example, an expansion of 
high-quality inexpensive day care centres. Parents who have a child in day care may 
find that this makes life easier for them, which we may consider as corresponding to an 
income increase. In addition, these parents as well as other couples who consider the 
possibility of having more children may expect that the costs of subsequent 
childbearing will be relatively low – provided that the supply of day care remains at the 
same level – and some may decide to have another child.  Indeed, such fertility-
stimulating effects on fertility have been documented in recent studies (Rindfuss et al. 
2007). Depending on its price, its exact influence on fertility, and the societal effect of a 
larger number of children, an expansion of day care may leave everyone better off, the 
two parties better off in total (most typically, an advantage for the child-bearers that 
exceeds the disadvantage for the remaining population), or it may reduce the total well-
being in society. In reality, there will always be uncertainty about this (and similarly for 
other policies one might consider). In addition, the issue is further complicated by the Demographic Research: Volume 22, Article 22 
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fact that there may also be externalities associated with letting the remaining population 
keep the money and with the parents’ lifestyle beyond the additional childbearing, and 
there may be other types of effects of having children in day care, for example on their 
intellectual development, with consequences both for the children themselves and 
others. However, more knowledge about determinants of fertility, and especially about 
how various education, family and labour-market policies have affected fertility in the 
past, at least facilitates assessment of the costs of raising the number of children 
through various measures. This in turn increases the chance that a wise decision is taken 





3.3 Other responses to possible societal-level consequences  
Regardless of whether it is concluded that something should be done to increase 
fertility, politicians may want to make attempts to minimize the negative macro-level 
consequences of low fertility. Again, demographers’ insight into fertility trends and 
determinants may be useful. This is explained below.   
In particular, there are some steps that can be taken to ameliorate the consequences 
of ageing. One may, for example, increase the age at which workers become eligible for 
retirement pension, which may involve some efforts to increase the productivity of 
older workers (who tend to be healthier than ever before) through human capital or 
other investments. One may also make it easier for women to work, one may get people 
ready for work at a lower age through more efficient educational programs, and (unless 
immigration is suspected to produce major social problems) one may allow more 
immigration
10 (Grant et al. 2004; Blake and Mayhew 2006). The negative effect of the 
productivity of the work force because of ageing (even without any increase in 
retirement age) might be partly counteracted by life-long learning programs. In 
principle, it would of course also help if one could manage to get more out of the 
money in the health care, but this is not a sector where it is easy to make large 
efficiency gains. Obviously, the possible responses to ageing vary between countries 
 
9 It should be noted that such a policy must not necessarily build exclusively on economic incentives, such as 
mentioned above. For example, it is also possible that some people will change behaviour without economic 
compensation if they are informed about the externality. The good feeling of doing something for society may 
add to the value of a child and make them more inclined to have another one. 
10 As pointed out by several observers (Coleman 2008) and illustrated in a projection from the United Nations 
(2001), immigration is not necessarily an efficient remedy against ageing. The impact that immigrants leave 
on the age structure depends of course on their age, whether they give birth to many children, whether they or 
their descendants stimulate later immigration of young adults (especially through marriage with persons from 
the country of origin), and whether they return to their home country of origin when they get old.  Kravdal: Demographers’ interest in fertility trends and determinants in developed countries  
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and depend, for example, on the characteristics of the labour force at the outset, the 
economic resources, and the political attitudes.  
If the size and age structure of the future population were known, it would be 
easier to establish sound and appropriately scaled coping strategies such as mentioned 
in due time. In reality, all a planner or politician can hope for is a forecast showing 
possible developments of the future population structure, perhaps coupled with some 
indications about how likely each of them are. Most commonly, forecasters present a 
few discrete trajectories to illustrate the magnitude of the uncertainty, without being 
specific about the probability distribution, though one trajectory may be pointed to as 
the most likely. Obviously, the extreme trajectories cannot be considered as the lower 
and upper bound of what one might possibly experience in the future (i.e. there is not a 
100% probability that reality falls within these trajectories). A stochastic population 
projection is an alternative and increasingly popular approach (see for example Booth 
(2006) for a review of population projection methods.) It provides information about 
the probability that the population measure under study falls within certain limits. For 
example, a 60% or a 80% confidence interval may be presented, the latter of course 
being wider than the former. It is not obvious what type of confidence intervals that 
would be most helpful to a planner: 80% intervals may be important for some purposes, 
and smaller intervals for others.  
Regardless of whether a national forecast is deterministic or stochastic, it is based 
on some ideas about or models for the range of possible fertility levels in the future, and 
similarly for mortality and international migration. These ideas or models typically 
reflect the fertility history of the country. For example, a main trajectory of fertility 
rates may be chosen on the basis of a more or less formal extrapolation of the recent 
overall trend. Alternative trajectories may reflect earlier particularly low or high levels, 
or a confidence interval may be determined by a statistical model that essentially 
incorporates earlier levels of fertility and the magnitude of the annual changes that have 
occurred. In addition, one may have an eye to earlier forecast errors when defining 
possible deviations from the main fertility alternative. Further, one may draw on 
experts’ opinions when doing this, or when making assumptions about the main 
alternative. These opinions will be based on the experts’ knowledge about determinants 
of fertility and their ideas about the future development of these determinants (perhaps 
inspired by what has happened in other countries).  
Alternatively, one might consider making more explicit use of the knowledge 
about fertility determinants by including them in the projection model (see also 
Sanderson 1998). The value of such an approach would of course hinge on the 
assumption that the causal effects (determinants) that one in principle hopes to identify 
in a certain data material also are relevant for the setting under study and throughout the 
projection period. To justify the approach, it must also be easier to foresee trends in Demographic Research: Volume 22, Article 22 
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incomes, education, and other fertility determinants than to forecast fertility more 
directly. A few attempts at such forecasting have been made, but they have not been 
very successful (Booth 2006).  
The goal is of course to make the forecasts more accurate, in the sense that there is 
little difference between the main forecast alternative and reality. Using the stochastic-
projection terminology, we may also say that the goal is to narrow the confidence 
intervals (e.g. reduce the difference between the upper and lower limit of the 80% 
interval) and make them more correct (meaning for example that in 80% of the 
projections presenting 80% intervals, the outcome actually fall within the interval). This 
is no easy task. For example, Keilman (2008) has concluded that none of the new 
techniques that have been employed over the last couple of decades have mattered 
much for the accuracy of the forecasts, which have improved very little. However, 
although earlier attempts to improve the forecasts – also through a more extensive use 
of knowledge about fertility trends and determinants – have not proved very successful, 
it is not impossible that future efforts to expand this knowledge, combined with 
development of better techniques to implement it in forecasts, some day will pay off. 
Since values are more stable than many other fertility determinants, one place to start 
may be to develop better measures of a broad set of values among adolescents and 
young adults and assess their importance for later reproductive behaviour.  
 
 
3.4 Another perspective: Low fertility is unproblematic, but we need to know 
about it  
A more extreme version of the arguments above would be that low fertility may have 
harmful effects, but that these can be completely outbalanced by pulling certain strings 
in due time  – at no costs – so that low fertility really is unproblematic. For example, 
one might argue that low fertility will make it more difficult to find sufficient labour for 
old age care in the future, but that one may import labour whenever necessary, and that 
this really comes with no costs.  It is possible that some politicians or researchers have a 
completely “unconcerned” attitude like this and think that the fertility level really 
doesn’t matter in any way, in the sense that we can cope just as well with low as with 
high fertility (but with different policies), as long as we know some time in advance 
what the level will be. As just pointed out, the latter may be easier if we have good 
knowledge about trends and determinants of fertility, so even from such a perspective, 
there would be need for research in this area.   
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4. Conclusions  
There are good reasons why demographers should continue their efforts to learn about 
fertility trends and determinants in low-fertility settings. One is that such knowledge 
may be helpful when trying to find out whether low fertility actually has the harmful 
societal consequences through ageing and population decline that have been suggested 
by some observers, and whether there are important (unforeseen) consequences for the 
individual families. (The fact that people perhaps are somewhat unhappy because they 
do not have as many children as they would have liked to have if conditions were better 
is less of a public concern.) In principle, researchers in other areas who see it as their 
goal to assess the consequences of low fertility may be able to make good use of the 
knowledge about trends and determinants that is produced by demographers, but it is 
possible that more advances will be made if demographers get more involved in the 
process than they currently do. At present, demographers’ research priorities are rather 
unbalanced. There is a large stream of papers about trends and determinants and quite 
little attention to the consequences. 
Another reason for keeping up the work on trends and determinants is that, if 
future analysis reveals that there probably are harmful consequences of low fertility, 
knowledge about trends and determinants may be used to find out whether it actually is 
worth trying to change people’s reproductive behaviour and how that might be done. In 
addition, even without the intention of changing fertility, politicians may be eager to 
know at least how widespread the low-fertility behaviour is and will be in the future, 
because this may help to ameliorate its consequences. It may possibly be easier to 
satisfy this demand if there is more knowledge about fertility trends and determinants, 
and if higher priority is given to research on how this knowledge can be translated into 
good forecasts.  
Should we ever be able to conclude that low fertility has no unforeseen adverse 
effects at the individual level and no harmful consequences for society, there would be 
much less need for research on trends and determinants. However, we will probably 
never get into such a position. There will always be reasons to suspect that childbearing 
may have some important consequences that may deserve public attention.  
To summarize, the message to active researchers and funding agencies is that there 
is indeed important work to be done on trends and determinants of fertility in low-
fertility settings, but that demographers with an expertise in this also could make good 
use of themselves by getting more involved in efforts to understand the consequences of 
low fertility and perhaps to improve forecasts. Whether research in other areas, within 
demography or other disciplines, is even more important is a different issue.  
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Appendix  
Table A1: Classification
a of papers on fertility and its consequences in 















  1990-2007 1990-2007  1990-2007*  1990-2007  1999-2007 
Fertility trends, measurement, determinants
b 49 32  48 52  51 
          
Consequences of fertility for women’s work  10  2  3  12  0 
Consequences of fertility for family behaviour
c 4 1  0 3  0 
Other individual-level consequences of fertility
d 5 2  4 2  1 












Consequences of age at first birth in particular  1  0  1  1  0 
Compensating for low fertility/ageing  2  1  1  3  0 
Forecasts of fertility  0  1  2  2  0 
          
Papers that neither deal specifically with 
developed countries nor with developing 
countries, but that are more general: 
       
Fertility measurements, determinants, theory  9  9  13  0  6 
Individual-level consequences  1  0  0  1  0 
Consequences of population changes   2  1  38  3  0 
Forecasts, mathematical demography, changes 
in population structure 
6 4  14 4  9 
 
* including supplements 
** excluding supplements
a Classification is difficult, especially because topics are hard to define sharply and because some papers address multiple topics. 
However, few papers place much emphasis on both consequences and determinants of fertility.  
b Papers on pro-natalist policies are included, but not those on abortion and those having a strict focus on whether the child is born in 
wedlock 
c Only papers with a rather explicit focus on effects of fertility are included. 
d Papers dealing with consequences of whether the child is wanted or not are excluded.  